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AbSTrACT
This research focused on public sector organizations, especially local public 
enterprises, and verified their sticky costs using panel data analysis. The 
results show, contrary to the research hypotheses, that anti-sticky costs are 
present in local public enterprises. We thought that the impact of the water 
supply business that accounts for about 60% of the sample was high. Then, 
we further analyzed the sample data by excluding them, and the result 
nevertheless indicated the presence of sticky costs. Based on these results, 
it became clear that in local public enterprises, the degree of sticky costs 
varies depending on the type of industry. It is suggested that the differences 
for sticky costs may be affected from not only the differences in the business 
environment but also in the differences in the cost structure for each type 
of industry, and the differences in legal regulations, market share rates and 
pricing methods.
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iNTROduCTiON
In order to perform management smoothly, it is very important to understand 
cost behavior. Cost behavior is a theme that has been attracting attention 
from both the academic and business practices, and it may be said that 
the grasp of cost behavior is an important research theme in management 
accounting today.
In traditional cost-behavior research, we tried to grasp cost behavior 
using the production and working hours in relation to business volume 
which is the activity amount of the enterprise to break it down into a cost 
element such as fixed costs and variable costs. In the process, the cost has 
been linear and proportional to changes in the relevant range, and in direct 
costing; it has been assumed that the change in cost was proportional.
Many later studies, including Noreen and Soderstrom (1997) and 
Anderson et al. (2003), have brought  attention and made it clear that in 
sticky costs, the cost does not decrease at the time  the sales amount decreases 
symmetrically; whereas the cost was empirically observed to increase at 
the time  the sales amount increases symmetrically. Anderson et al. (2003) 
have verified sticky costs using the models that were used to describe 
the sales of the rate of change that was a proxy for activity variables, the 
explanatory variables, and selling, general and administrative expenses of 
the rate of change that was a proxy for cost variables the dependent variable, 
by published financial data. In Figure 1, with respect to the normal t-1 phase 
of the slope, from t-1 period to t period it should change proportionately and 
linearly, but the sticky costs make a smaller slope than the slope towards 
the period.
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Cost function to be seen  when 
sales amount decreases in 
comparison with last year
Cost function to be seen 
when sales amount 
increases in comparison 
ｔ period costs
ｔ period 
salesｔ －１ period sales
ｔ －１
period
costs
figure 1: arranged with Reference to yasukata (2012)
After Anderson et al. (2003), researchers have attempted to make 
additional verifications on the basis of cost data in an organization. 
Subramaniam and Weidenmier (2003) verified sticky costs from the scales 
of the properties of the business environment and tangible fixed assets, and 
the aspects that the capacity utilization of those properties is furthermore 
different between industries. 
Hirai and Shiiba (2006) verified whether sticky costs were observed 
in Japanese firms based on the hypothesis that the cost behavior varied in 
the country depending on the analytic model of Anderson et al. (2003). As 
a result of the analysis, they clarified that sticky costs were indeed observed 
in Japanese firms. 
Yasukata et al. (2011) paid, to attention to nonprofit organizations like 
the national Hospital Organization. As a result of the analysis, they clarified 
that the secured profit was attained by a positive reduction in materials costs 
in the decrease phase of medical revenue while sticky costs were seen in 
expenditure on salary. 
Holzhacker et al. (2015) were from the viewpoint of the profit centred 
corporation, the nonprofit organization, and public sector organizations. 
They clarified that the reaction of private hospitals to the cancellation of 
sticky costs was smaller and larger in the decrease phase of earnings, and 
58
Asia-Pacific Management Accounting Journal, Volume 13 Issue 2
in the phase of deterioration of earnings due to the consultation fee control 
policy.
Most of these prior studies focused on commercial companies, because 
the structure of the financial statements is different from public sector 
organizations and as such they have been excluded as research subjects.
In addition to the origin of sticky costs, two opinions - the deliberate 
managerial decision view and the high adjustment costs view are being 
carefully examined now. In the deliberate managerial decision view, 
management results determine the economical possibility that the cost 
becomes sticky. In other words, if the management has determined that the 
future economic recovery closes, it maintains the excess capacity. 
In the high adjustment costs view, the possibility that an action 
to reduce activity cost and manage the capacity cost of the manager, in 
comparison with a decrease in sales amount  does not match up with what is 
being pointed out. In addition, it is thought that sticky costs may be present 
because the committed capacity cost, caused by past decision making, 
continues occurring even at the time of a decrease in the sales amount.
In this study, we pay  attention to local public enterprises which 
make financial statements based on business accounting and are available 
for comparison with the commercial companies based on indications  as 
suggested in  Kama and Weiss (2013).We analyze the characteristics and 
compare with prior studies to detect if sticky costs are present in public 
sector organizations.
ChaRaCTERiSTiCS Of PuBliC SECTOR 
ORgaNiZaTiONS
Current Situations and issues Surrounding Public Sector 
Organizations
Today, there are problems such as aging, low birth rate, decline of 
the workforce and population, and regional economic decline and fiscal 
inflexibility(1). To supply administrative services in a more stable and 
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efficient manner continuously, we have to examine efficiency and cost 
performance, and be conscious of fiscal soundness.
On the other hand, it is difficult to indicate the appropriate level 
of the quality and quantity of administrative services and the cost of its 
service objectively. From the viewpoint of cost management, effective 
administrative services and cost control is required in the public sector 
organizations in future.
Public sector organizations are currently promoted by the efforts of 
the compact city wishing to make a further reduction of administrative 
costs by consolidation of city functions through the integration such as 
public facilities, and further promoting the efficiency of administrative 
services. Effort to advance the future of the compact city is required to 
promote cost management in order to understand cost behavior of public 
sector organizations.
institutional Theory features of Public Sector Organizations
Local public enterprises in public sector organizations
Local public enterprises deal with water supply, industrial water supply, 
orbit, car transportation, railroad, electricity, gas and hospital business, etc. 
according to local public enterprise law and cover a wide range of public 
services. local public enterprises are leading figures in offering public 
services (public in nature) and expected  to exert economic rationality by 
incorporating business accounting in its operations (economic efficiency).. 
In this way, local public enterprises have the mission practice sustainable 
management and cost optimization by improving economic efficiency and 
the pursuit of reasonable profits that focusses on profitability. In this regard, 
this is different in characteristics from pure public service to cover tax.
Local public enterprises in comparison with commercial 
enterprises
Commercial enterprises are required to earn from the perspective of 
maximization of profit. However, the continuity of stable business activity 
is required for local public enterprises, not only in economic terms but also 
from the viewpoint of improving the welfare of the residents. For this reason, 
local public enterprises would be subjected to institutional constraints from 
a variety of stakeholders. We have organized the characteristics as follows:
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The first of the features is that a low-profit level is allowed while 
maintaining a balance between the various stakeholders. It is more important 
for managers to decide on evading a loss due to management failure than 
to earn much profit. Furthermore, from the point of view to ensure the 
continuity of their business which is public in nature, the managers of local 
public enterprises have to acquire permission from councilors in their low-
profit making decisions.
The second feature is, unlike the commercial companies, local public 
enterprises have to submit a balance sheet and budget to the chiefs who are 
usually mayors or governors and congress, and there is a need to obtain 
the approval from them. It means that local public enterprises do not 
assume limited liability for the maintenance of their business, while also 
acknowledging the management of independence. So local governments 
are responsible for maintain the business in the end. Therefore, we can see 
that some businesses have continued even if they are deficit operations. 
RESEaRCh hyPOThESES
In this study, we focused on the public sector organizations that have not 
been analyzed enough up to now, especially local public enterprises, and 
we set the following research hypotheses. Most of the empirical studies 
concerning cost behavior targeted commercial companies, and the existence 
of sticky costs is verified from the differences in organizational property, 
capacity, and utilization. First of all, based on prior studies, we think that we 
should verify whether sticky costs are also present in local public enterprises.
H1:  The sticky costs exist in local public enterprises.
It has been pointed out that in  public sector organizations including 
local public enterprises, financial inflexibility such as mandatory spending 
like the national debt service expenditure,  public bonds and the labor 
costs, and the ratios of the existing expenditure increases compared  to 
general finances,. Also, it is thought that the declining degree of freedom 
of the budget makes sticky costs become stronger compared to commercial 
companies (Anderson et al., 2003). 
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Moreover, local public enterprises have organizational behavioral traits 
on both sides of the economy and publicity; and this feature is different 
from commercial companies that attempt at the maximization of profit. 
Basing on this feature, we think that there is a difference in decision making 
concerning the business manager’s cost adjustment. Holzhacker et al.(2015) 
have clarified that cost behavior of  public sector organizations was verified 
from the aspect  of the institution theory and economics, and  sticky costs 
appeared to be strong compared to commercial companies(2).
In addition, public sector organizations put a lot of regulatory costs by 
the adjustment of the budget because they are under government guarantee 
for funding of financial affairs and the risk is on the management. There 
is little necessity to consider the distribution of residual income, and the 
pursuit of profit is not the first objective of public sector organizations. 
Therefore we hypothesis that: 
H2: Sticky costs in local public enterprises are stronger than in commercial 
companies.
Anderson et al. (2003) analysed how sticky costs change in two or more 
years. When sticky cost is found in public sector organizations, it should 
be examined how it changes after two or more years especially, because 
the purpose of local public enterprises is not only about publicity but also 
economic. Public sector enterprises have a distinct feature compared to 
commercial companies which give priority only to the maximization of 
profit. In other words, because it is necessary to carry on with an operation 
from a public interest viewpoint, even if they cannot make a profit, it is 
believed that sticky costs are not cancelled or decreased even in the mid/long 
term compared to commercial companies. Therefore we hypothesise that:
H3: Sticky costs are not cancelled or decreased in public sector 
organizations in the two, three or four years. 
The type of business varies, such as, the water supply, waterworks for 
industrial use, the orbit, public car transportation,  railway,  electricity, gas, 
hospital, drainage,  market, the tolled roads , and  parking lot maintenance, 
etc. which is decided in the Local Public Enterprise Law and Municipality 
Ordinance. As Subramaniam and Weidenmier (2003) pointed out, since 
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the business environment is different according to the type of business 
and industry. The size and the capacity of the tangible fixed asset, and the 
inventory, is different, it is believed that cost behavior is also different. 
Therefore we hypothesise that:
H4: Since the business environment in public sector enterprises is different 
in each type of business, the level of sticky costs is also different 
depending on the type of business.
aNalySiS METhOdS  
analysis Model
Prior research on commercial companies have largely depended on 
the Anderson et al. (2003) analytic model. Accounting in public sector 
organizations, selling general and administrative costs are not legal 
descriptions while sales corresponds to the revenue from operations. 
Therefore, in this study, we used the operating expense in which cost of 
goods sold and selling general and administrative costs are added up instead 
of only using selling general and administrative costs.
In Subramaniam and Weidenmier (2003), empirically verified cost 
behavior by using not only the selling general and administrative costs but 
also the cost of goods sold. Sticky costs were verified by many researches 
afterwards using operating expense (Günther et al. 2014).
Then we verified whether sticky costs exist in the public sector 
organizations in hypothesis 1 using the following analytic models used by 
Anderson et al. (2003).
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Cost: the operating expense, Revenue: the operating revenue, Decrease_Dummy: the
dummy variable that if the operating revenue decreases from t-1 at t period, 1 is taken in
other cases, 0 is taken, log: Naturalized logarithm.
In hypothesis 2, we verify whether sticky costs appears more strongly in public
sector organizations than in commercial companies from the sticky costs point of view.
In hypothesis 3, to verify the cost behavior for two or more years, we performed the
analysis tabulated for each section using the formula (5-1) of Anderson et al. (2003), and
we also performed the analysis using the formula (5-2) of Anderson et al. (2003).
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Cost: the operating expense, Revenue: the operating revenue, Decrease_Dummy: the
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Here, 
Cost: the operating expense, Revenue: the operating revenue, 
Decrease_Dummy: the dummy variable that if the operating revenue 
decreases from t-1 at t period, 1 is taken in other cases, 0 is taken, log: 
Naturalized logarithm. 
In hypothesis 2, we verify whether sticky costs appears more strongly 
in  public sector organizations than  in commercial companies from the 
sticky costs point of view. 
In hypothesis 3, to verify the cost behavior for two or more years, we 
performed the analysis tabulated for each section using the formula (5-1) 
of Anderson et al. (2003), and we also performed the analysis using the 
formula (5-2) of Anderson et al. (2003).
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Here,
Cost: the operating expense, Revenu : the operating revenue, 
Decrease_Dummy: th  dummy v riable that if the operating revenue 
decreases from t-1(t-2) at t (t-1) period, 1 is taken in other cases, 0 is taken, 
log: Naturalized logarithm.
If sticky costs continue  in the long term, the operating expense is 
asymmetric for the change of  revenue from operations before one term 
indicated by the expression (5-2),and it is sure to become a value  which is 
not only β2 but also β4 is smaller than 0.
In hypothesis 4, we analyzed the local public enterprises by industries 
using the formula (5-1).
64
Asia-Pacific Management Accounting Journal, Volume 13 Issue 2
daTa aNd SaMPlE SElECTiON
analysis Period Covered
In this study, we tried to analyze using the financial data of local public 
enterprises. Furthermore, for comparison with the Anderson et al. (2003) and 
Hirai and Shiiba (2006) we also used the same period; from 1979 to 1998. 
There is no bias in the difference in the method of accounting treatment 
because the review concerning the financial accounting processing, 
according to the Local Public Enterprise Law revision, was not amended 
until 2012 after it was initially amended in 1966.
Sample data
In this study, we performed an analysis centered on a business subject 
in the application of the local Public Enterprise law. We used the data in the 
income statement for each business found in the “Local Public Enterprises 
Yearbook”. The number of businesses implementing the Local Public 
Enterprise Law was 2,854 s (57,080 samples) by ten types of business. It was 
received continuously for 20 years from the fiscal year 1979 to 1998. The 
66 businesses (1,320 samples) that did not actually begin and when revenue 
from operations has not been generated were excluded from the analysis. 
In addition, the municipal mergers were carried out during the period of 
analysis in the 19 businesses (380 samples). These were excluded from our 
analysis since there is a doubt regarding the consistency of business, so we 
could avoid the bias.
Though the deficit businesses were uniformly excluded and were done 
in the analysis of Anderson et al.(2003) etc., many settlement of accounts 
of local public enterprises were in deficit; expenditures were greater than 
revenue, which is responsible for the necessity of public utilities to engage 
in social life, such as lifelines and infrastructure in many cases. Therefore, 
in this study, we excluded only about 373 businesses (7,460 samples) that 
lacked the balance in all the surveyed period for 20 years. Finally, the 
analysis object became 47,920 samples in 10 types of businesses and 2,396 
businesses with a data of 20 years from 1979 to 1998 (Table 1).
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Table 1: Number of Samples and Exclusion Number Passage Table
Observation (firm 
years) deleted (and 
the number of firms)
Observation (firm 
years) Remaining 
(and the number of 
firms)
Beginning raw sample data 
(1979-1998)
– – 57,080 (2,854)
1. Delete observation that
are operating revenues =
0 yen because of business 
preparations
1,320 (66) 55,760 (2,788)
2. Delete observations that
aren't securing business
continuity because of
municipal merger
380 (19) 55,380 (2,769)
3. Delete observations with
operating costs > operating 
revenues through all 20
years
7,460 (373) 49,920 (2,396)
Final observations (Firm 
Years) remaining
– – 47,920 (2,396)
In addition, we excluded samples which businesses were outliers in 
the top and bottom 1 % respectively of Cost i, t/Cost i, t-1, and Revenue i, 
t/Revenue i, t-1 because there was a possibility that the unexpected value 
(outlier) is included in the1% in the top and 1% in the bottom. As a result, 
the excluded number of data became 1,036 samples, and the number of data 
finally analyzed became 44,488 samples (Table 2).
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aNalySiS RESulT
descriptive Statistics
First of all, the water supply business comprised of 1,625 business 
samples (about 67%). Then, 9,340 samples (approximately 19%) were in the 
hospital business, 548 businesses, industrial water supply is 128 business 
2,560 samples (approximately 5%), gas business 66 business 1,320 samples 
(about 2%). 
Next, in our sample, especially in the value of the standard deviation, 
it was characterized that both operating expenses and the operating revenue 
were larger than the average value. And there were features that showed 
that the difference between the maximum value and the minimum value 
was large, and there was a big difference between the median and the mean 
value. In addition, the operating revenue exceeded the operating expense by 
the mean value and the median, when the operating revenue was compared 
with the operating expense. It meant that structural money-losing enterprises 
(loss firms) didn’t exist in the sample data, because businesses in which the 
operating expense was more than the operating revenue for all the analysis 
period was excluded, based on prior studies (Table 3).
Table 3: descriptive Statistics of Sample data (after Excluding Outliers)
(Scale: 1,000 yen)
Mean Standard deviation Minimum
lower 
quartile
Revenue (Operating revenues) 1,825,251 10,019,753 2,809 171,564
Cost (Operating costs) 1,559,054 7,326,136 2,222 136,560
In Revenue t/Revenue t-1 0.0470 0.0812 -0.2877 0.0007
In Cost t/Cost t-1 0.0478 0.0801 -0.2840 0.0044
Median upper quartile Maximum
Number 
of firm 
years
Revenue (Operating revenues) 407,769 1,249,357 355,330,535 44,488
Cost (Operating costs) 338,988 1,116,223 295,467,927 44,488
In Revenue t/Revenue t-1 0.0323 0.0773 0.3930 44,488
In Cost t/Cost t-1 0.0421 0.0858 0.3876 44,488
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Type of industries
Mean Standard deviation
Revenue
(Operating 
revenues)
Cost 
(Operating 
costs)
Revenue–
Cost
Revenue 
(Operating 
revenues)
Cost 
(Operating 
costs)
Water supply 1,227,682 981,119 246,563 8,508,912 6,712,921
Industrial water supply 758,354 583,579 174,775 1,235,284 989,192
Transportation 10,572,346 10,306,967 265, 379 25,369,008 23,115,846
Electric power 2,374,254 1,655,826 718,429 1,725,437 1,245,771
Gas power 915,302 820,444 94,858 1,182,181 1,060,343
Hospital 2,447,471 2,545,926 -98,455 2,499,614 2,592,117
Sewerage 25,279,611 15,864,157 9,415,454 58,266,300 31,924,323
Wholesale Market 1,117,203 1,019,061 98,142 1,591,534 1,474,367
Toll Road 760,845 594,971 165,873 494,389 295,988
Car parking 151,833 87,190 64,643 151,932 78,899
Type of industries
Median Maximum Minimum
Revenue 
(Operating 
revenue)
Cost 
(Operating 
costs)
Revenue 
(Operating 
revenue)
Cost 
(Operating 
costs)
Revenue 
(Operating 
revenue)
Cost 
(Operating 
costs)
Water supply 264,890 205,639 355,330,353 295,467,927 14,850 15,419
Industrial water 
supply
345,957 275,226 11,326,896 8,042,787 2,809 2,956
Transportation 1,720,389 1,867,155 163,824,708 149,541,551 83,961 73,872
Electric power 2,039,012 1,405,505 9,529,287 7,869,884 158,784 106,467
Gas power 481,267 435,910 7,777,095 6,805,552 64,114 55,944
Hospital 1,494,156 1,571,137 21,032,304 20,502,866 79,612 109,442
Sewerage 3,829,400 3,232,100 340,350,591 194,333,891 82,233 121,626
Wholesale Market 520,297 500,996 6,430,996 6,885,937 101,377 70,401
Toll Road 605,286 530,918 2,127,252 1,482,174 46,833 89,087
Car parking 115,492 65,799 563,130 298,094 4,366 2,222
As shown in Table 3, the amount of operating expenses and revenues 
differ significantly between types of industries. The situation might be due to 
several factors including the scale of business and the scale of government 
financing for each industry. Moreover, it was also found that majority of 
the businesses were making surplus where sewerage industry recorded the 
highest. on the other hand, the hospital was the only industry making losses.
In addition, the operating cost composition ratio by types of industry 
was summarized in Table 4 below. As shown in the Table, operating costs 
covered in this study are labor cost, depreciation, material cost, power cost, 
repair cost, interest expenses and others.   
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Verification Results of the Sticky Costs in the Public Sector 
Organizations
As shown in Table 5 below, the analysis results were significant at 1%, 
thus the effectiveness of the model was confirmed. Further, in this study 
we used panel data analysis, and performed Hausman test, it was revealed 
that the fixed effects model was suitable (Table 5).
In hypothesis 1, to verify whether the sticky costs exist in the public 
sector organizations, we tried to analyze referring to the analytic model of 
Anderson et al. (2003). In our analytic model, we have converted each the 
relative change from last year of the operating expense (explained variable) 
and the operating revenue (explanatory variable) into the naturalized 
logarithm. β1 is equal to the increasing ratio of the operating expense when 
the ratio of operating revenue from the previous year increased by 1%. And, 
when the ratio of the operating revenue is decreased by 1%, the estimate 
becomes the value in which β1 and β2 are added together. In this case, if the 
sticky costs are confirmed, it becomes β2<0 and β1>β1+β2, and it means 
the rate of change of the operating expense becomes asymmetrical at the 
increase and the decrease of the operating revenue ratio.
Table 5: Verification Results of Model (5-1)
Predicted 
sign Pooled fixed-effect
Random-
effect
β0 0.030 *** 0.0317 *** 0.0301 ***
65.41 66.18 64.73 ***
β1 + 0.4333 *** 0.4081 *** 0.4333 ***
β2 – 0.3035 *** 0.3440 *** 0.3035 ***
20.04 21.06 19.83
Adj.R2 0.2508 0.2350 0.2508
N 44,488 44,488 44,488
DW 2.1697 2.2374 2.1697
H-Test Stastic
335.04
degree of freedom
(2)
P-value
0
upper data indicates coefficient estimates, under data indicates t-statistics, *significant at 10% level,**significant at 5% 
level,***significant at 1% level, Adj.R2=Adjusted R2,N=Number of Observation, DW=Durbin-Watson ratio, H-Test: Hausman 
Test
 As a result, β2 showed a plus value that indicates sticky costs. So, anti-
sticky costs that Anderson and lanen (2007), Weiss (2010), and Banker et 
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al. (2014b) had reported  is confirmed. Anti-sticky means a decrease in 
the ratio of the operating expense when the decrease of the operating 
revenue is higher than the increase of the ratio of the operating expense 
when the operating revenue is increased (Figure 2). Therefore, sticky 
costs are not confirmed in this analysis intended for the entire local 
public enterprises, and hypothesis 1 is not supported. As shown in Table 
5, the fixed effect presumption was not greatly different from the 
estimated result of the cross section, and neither was anti-sticky costs 
that β2 became the plus value was confirmed. Thus we didn’t need to 
verify research hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 3.
To verify hypothesis 4, we conducted an analysis of the cost behavior 
by industry from the point of view of the differences of the business 
environment, cost structure, and capacity. And, we verified the presence 
and the level of sticky costs (Table 6). 
The sticky costs in which β2 took a negative value were the hospital 
business and electricity utilities industry. In contrast anti-sticky costs in 
which the β2 indicated a positive value were the water supply business, 
industrial water supply business, and gas business. 
sticky costs
anti-sticky costs
ｔ period costs
ｔ period 
salesｔ －１ period sales
ｔ －１
period
costs
figure 2
Here, we would like to pay attention to the contrasting results between 
the water supply business and the hospital business which were found in 
large numbers in the sample. When we confirmed the cost structure of 
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the local public enterprises(3), in the cost composition ratio of the hospital 
business, it was observed to have a lower depreciation and amortization 
and conversely a higher labor and material cost. on the other hand, in the 
cost composition ratio of the water supply business, it was observed that 
depreciation and amortization, repair costs and interest expenses were 
higher than all the average industries. Similarly, we could confirm that 
the hospital business was in deficit and the water supply business was 
conversely in surplus(4). In this way, in addition to the difference in the 
business environment, a large difference can be seen in the capacity and 
cost structure in the water supply business and the hospital business. Further 
analyses were conducted in this regard.
Among the local public enterprises, especially in the water supply 
business, the sticky costs pointed out in prior studies showed a contradictory 
result. We argue for this factor as follows.
First, because the water supply business supplies high quality service 
and has to be stable and does the management almost exclusively, it has the 
flexibility of cost adjustment. We think that this factor has contributed to 
the presence of anti-sticky costs in the water supply business(5).
Second, because price imputation of the cost adequately reflects the 
management situation by adopting the summary cost method(6) in a water 
rate system, we think that it is in the financial structure that the sticky costs 
do not appear easily.
In the hospital business, sticky costs were confirmed similar to prior 
studies such as Holzhacker et al. (2015). We would like to point out the 
factors as follows. First, we think that the factors which have caused the 
existence of sticky costs are the fixed price   in the medical treatment fee 
structure, and the diagnosis and treatment obligation based on law. In the 
hospital business, the charge for each medical service is provided by a fixed 
price regulation. Also, according to the diagnosis and treatment obligation 
based on law, it is necessary to treat the patient at any time even if patient 
is absent. 
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Table 6: Results of Model (5-1) by Industrial Classification
0.0337 *** 0.0353 *** 0.0337 *** 0.0235 *** 0.0243 *** 0.0235 *** 0.0146 *** 0.0149 *** 0.0146 ***
55.77 56.38 55.13 11.24 11.21 11.10 4.60 4.43 4.60
0.3867 *** 0.3632 *** 0.3867 *** 0.2613 *** 0.2454 *** 0.2613 *** 0.3532 *** 0.3218 *** 0.3532 ***
63.46 56.83 62.72 8.63 7.63 8.52 6.43 5.20 6.42
0.4614 *** 0.5136 *** 0.4614 *** 0.2372 *** 0.2841 *** 0.2372 *** 0.1549 0.1465 0.1549
23.11 23.91 22.84 3.19 3.49 3.15 1.24 1.05 1.24
H-test
0.0198 *** 0.0196 *** 0.0198 *** 0.0134 *** 0.0142 *** 0.0134 *** 0.0209 *** 0.0210 *** 0.0209 ***
6.55 6.29 6.41 7.10 7.28 6.99 33.27 32.06 32.91
0.5750 *** 0.5733 *** 0.5750 *** 0.7250 *** 0.7118 *** 0.7250 *** 0.6298 *** 0.6233 *** 0.6298 ***
14.04 13.42 13.75 35.24 33.28 34.68 89.54 84.13 88.57
-0.3352 ** -0.3658 ** -0.3352 * 0.3605 *** 0.3864 *** 0.3605 *** -0.2010 *** -0.2279 *** -0.2010 ***
-1.98 -2.04 -1.94 5.35 5.46 5.27 -10.52 -11.05 -10.40
H-test
0.0399 *** 0.0414 *** 0.0403 0.0224 *** 0.0227 *** 0.0224 *** 0.0211 0.0215 0.0211
9.87 10.16 9.15 3.71 3.64 3.63 1.17 1.17 1.15
0.3314 *** 0.3089 *** 0.3251 0.6106 *** 0.5995 *** 0.6106 *** 0.0205 0.0573 0.0205
9.03 8.15 8.86 5.42 5.10 5.30 0.07 0.19 0.07
-0.1497 -0.1387 -0.1475 -0.4122 -0.4092 -0.4122 0.5603 0.5619 0.5603
-0.79 -0.72 -0.78 -1.15 -1.09 -1.13 1.28 1.27 1.26
H-test
0.0247 0.0240 0.0247
1.45 1.32 1.42
0.1862 0.1731 0.1862
0.91 0.80 0.90
-0.0274 -0.0770 -0.0274
-0.07 -0.16 -0.06
H-test
upper data indicates coefficient estimates, under data indicates t-statistics, *: significant at 10％ level, **: significant at 5％ level, ***: significant at 1％ level,
Adj.R2=Adjusted R2, n=number of Observations, DW=Durbin-Watson ratio, H-Test:Hausman Test
0.16(2)3.66
0.18920.1671
1.7764
β0
RandomFixedPooled
Car Parking
Adj.R2
β2
β1
-0.0043-0.0424-0.0043
DW
100100100N
2.07822.10442.0782
0.71(2)0.68
2.1380 1.5570 1.5670 1.5570
0.33 (2) 0.85 0.83 (2) 0.66
DW 1.8240 1.9642 1.8618 2.1380 2.1416
N 437 437 437 152 152 152 69 69 69
0.1616 0.1776 0.1410 0.1776 0.0732 0.0456 0.0732
1.8242
β0
β1
β2
Adj.R2
Sewerage Wholesale Market Toll Road
Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random
1,241
2.0808
3.47 (2) 0.18
1.7764
0.55
2.5942
8,783
8.59 (2) () 82.01 (2) 0.00
604 604 604 1,241
1.20 (2)
Pooled
1,241
2.1003 2.1402 2.1003
Gas Power Hospital
2.6207 2.5942
8,783 8,783
0.6585 0.6473 0.6585 0.5678 0.5583 0.5678
Pooled Fixed
0.2721 0.2413 0.2721
674 674
β0
β1
β2
Adj.R2
N
DW
Random Pooled Fixed Random
30,114
0.1333 0.1350
Fixed Random
N
DW
30,114 30,114 2,314 2,314 2,314 674
Electric Power
Fixed Random
2.2407 2.0808 2.1768
216.42 (2) 0.00 2.93 (2) 0.23
2.2112 2.2762 2.2112 2.2407 2.3079
β1
β2
Adj.R2 0.2218 0.2035 0.2218
Fixed Random Pooled
β0
0.0657 0.0414 0.0657 0.1350
Water Supply Industrial Water Supply Transportation
Pooled Fixed Random Pooled
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Speaking about the medical profession such as specialized physicians 
and nurses, even when the operating revenue decreases, it tends to evade 
salary cutting and layoff. In addition, because a severe standard has been 
installed in the statutory regulation to the execution of the layoff based on 
worker protection, we think that it is difficult to lay them off.
addiTiONal aNalySiS
We thought that the main cause of the presence of anti-sticky costs is the 
possibility of receiving the influence of the water supply business which 
accounted for about 67% of all the sample data.  Due to that, we excluded 
the sample of the water supply business, and we conducted an additional 
analysis to verify the hypothesis (hypothesis 4 is excluded).
additional analysis of Research hypothesis 1
As a result of analyzing hypothesis 1 using the formula (5-1) based 
on the data (with the exception of using the water supply business sample 
data), β2 took a negative value not only in the cross-section analysis but 
also in the panel data analysis. Therefore, sticky costs were confirmed in the 
entire local public enterprises, except in the water supply business (Table 
7). As a result, we confirmed the result which supported hypothesis 1 that 
sticky costs existed in all samples, except in the water supply business.
Table 7: Results of Model (5-1) Excluding water Supply industry
Predicted 
sign Pooled fixed-effect
Random-
effect
β0 0.0211 *** 0.0223 *** 0.0211 ***
32.81 33.08 32.61
β1 + 0.5715 *** 0.5461 *** 0.5715 ***
75.29 67.08 74.84
β2 – -0.0730 *** -0.0639 *** -0.0730 ***
-3.47 -2.80 -3.45
Adj.R2 0.3692 0.3615 0.3692
N 14,374 14,374 14,374
DW 2.0185 2.0925 2.0185
H-Test Stastic
335.04
degree of freedom
(2)
P-value
0
upper data indicates coefficient estimates, under data indicates t-statistics, *significant at 10% level,**significant at 5% 
level,***significant at 1% level, Adj.R2=Adjusted R2,N=Number of Observation, DW=Durbin-Watson ratio, H-Test: Hausman 
Test
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additional analysis of Research hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 was verified once again from the confirmation of the 
sticky costs in the sample except in the water supply business (Table 8). 
As a result of the analysis in Anderson et al. (2003) and Hirai and Shiiba 
(2006), β2 shows that the sticky costs had the value of -0.14 in commercial 
companies in Japan and -0.19 in commercial companies in the United 
States. On the other hand, in our study, β2 acquired the value of -0.06. Upon 
retrieving the results, we observed that the value which was acquired in 
our study was smaller in comparison to both the analyses in prior studies. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 2 which assumed for the sticky costs to be stronger 
in local public enterprises than in commercial companies was not supported. 
We point out the two following points from the viewpoint of publicity.
1. In local public enterprises, especially in high public interest businesses 
like the water supply business and the gas business, etc., the summary
cost method is adopted.
2. Because the ratio of the market monopoly is high, the businesses with
high public interest are thought to be setting up the market trend and
the demand forecast compared to commercial companies. The local
public enterprises which occupy a high market share can predict and
plan more accurately future goods and services and setting up market
trends and the demand forecasts.
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Table 8: Estimated Result of (5-1) and Comparison with Prior Studies
Public enterprises
0.0223 *** 0.0189 *** 0.0481 ***
33.08 23.64 39.88
0.5461 *** 0.6352 *** 0.5459 ***
67.08 84.57 164.11
-0.0639 *** -0.1398 *** -0.1914 ***
-2.80 -8.95 -26.14
Adj.R2 0.3615 0.3927 0.3663
N 14,374 20,539 63,958
upper data indicates coefficient estimates, under data indicates t-statistics
*significant at 10％ level,**significant at 5％ level,***significant at 1％ level
Adj.R2=Adjusted R2,N=Number of Observations, DW=Durbin-Watson ratio,
H-Test:Hausman Test
Commercial enterprises
β1
β2
Local public
enterprises
Japanese
enterprises
American
enterprises
β0
additional analysis of Research hypothesis 3
From the totaled analysis by using the formula (5-1) according to 
each section and the analysis of two or more years that used the formula 
(5-2), we verified long-term cost behavior (Table 9). Seeing the result of the 
cross-section analysis of Model (5-1) (results by the pooled data), a negative 
value was confirmed to be β2 in a total of four years in the long term. From 
these results, it can be said that sticky costs would be seen continuously in 
the long term in local public enterprises. on the other hand, when seeing 
the result of the cross-section analysis of Model (5-2) (results by the fixed-
effect data); positive values were confirmed to be β2 and β4. So we could 
not verify a consistent result from long term cost behavior. 
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CONCluSiON
In this study, we focused on local public enterprises which make financial 
statements based on business accounting. And we paid our attention 
to the comparison with commercial companies. Then, we analyzed the 
characteristics compared with prior studies, whether sticky costs are present 
in public sector organizations.  Sticky costs were not confirmed in the entire 
local public enterprises and were confirmed anti-sticky by Anderson and 
lanen (2007), Weiss (2010), and Banker et al. (2014b).
on the other hand, in the analysis of the cost behavior by industry 
both sticky costs and anti-sticky costs were confirmed. And we found a 
diversity of cost behavior in each industry type. We confirmed the two 
opposing results; both the sticky costs and the anti-sticky costs from each 
industry. Especially, we thought that the impact of the water supply business 
that accounts for about 67% of the sample was high. Then, we additionally 
analyzed the sample data excluding the water supply business.
As a result of the additional analysis, sticky costs was confirmed in 
the entire local public enterprises in the analyses, except the water supply 
business, and hypothesis 1 was supported from that result(7). However, in 
comparison with the commercial companies, sticky costs of the local public 
enterprises were weaker, and hypothesis 2 was not supported. Also, in the 
long-term cost behavior, sticky costs were not consistently confirmed, so 
hypothesis 3 was not supported.
In our study, though we derived our research hypotheses after basing 
both the deliberate managerial decision view and the high adjustment costs 
view pointed out by prior studies, there is a possibility that factors other 
than these are also influential  Especially, we thought that local public 
enterprises were not only influenced by the business environment but also 
the  market monopoly level, capacity selection, worker protection laws 
and regulations, and charge / pricing methods etc. from the viewpoint 
of stable service supply for daily necessities. We argue that these points 
influence cost behavior, especially sticky costs. In addition, we suggest that 
business managers in charge of local public enterprises are affected by the 
budgetary discussion systems and a lot of stakeholders who were head of 
municipalities and local assemblies. Thus, we argue that the peculiar cost 
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behavior is present in public sector organizations, because the public sector 
organizations operate in a system different from commercial companies.
Moreover, from our analysis of the cost behavior of local public 
enterprises, we confirmed for the first time that the striking feature appears 
in each business in the local public enterprises like the anti-sticky cost in 
the water supply business and the sticky costs in the hospital business.
Problems and Tasks in the future of Our Study
Finally, we point out the limitation of our research. We analysed using 
data of 20 years from the fiscal year 1979 to the fiscal year 1998 to avoid 
the influence of economic fluctuation on the business and to compare them 
with prior studies. But we will need to collect most recent data and it will 
be better to analyze and verify them, too.
In addition, because the operating revenue and the operating expense 
used for our analysis are data from financial statements, it is indicated that 
these financial data aren’t appropriate for proxy indicators of activity and 
cost (Anderson and lanen [2007], Günther et al. [2014]).Therefore, in future 
research, it is possible to use ‘revenue earning water’ in the case of the water 
supply business and ‘bed occupancy rate’ in case of the hospital business.
Note:
1. According to the material of the government, the government bond
ratio doubled to 24.3% in fiscal year 2015 though in the fiscal year
1980 was 12.7%. Moreover, the social security-related expenditure
increased to 32.7% in the fiscal year 2015 though it was 18.8% in the
fiscal year 1980.
2. In the viewpoint by the institution theory, the organization is pointed
out that a system restriction is received by the stakeholder. Additionally,
because they are vulnerable to the influence of the normative system
from the fact that there is a need to achieve total optimization in terms
of the public nature of the request, public sector organizations are
compared with the commercial companies.
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3. Refer to Table 4.
4. Refer to Table 3.
5. About the market monopoly situation of the local public enterprises,
there is a description in ‘The local public enterprises yearbook’ as
follows.
Table note 1
Gland total Breakdown of Local (B)/(A)
in Japan (A) public enterprises (B) (%)
Water supply Present water supply population (people) 121,289,000 120,523,000 99.4
Industrial water supply Quantity of annual total water supply (㎥) 493,000,000 4,897,000,000 99.9
Transportation (Subway) The annual transportation passengers (people) 4,723,000,000 2,638,000,000 55.9
Transportation (motor transport) The annual transportation passengers (people) 5,419,000,000 1,453,000,000 26.8
Electric power annual power generation (kWh) 146,288,000,000 9,618,000,000 0.9
Gas power Annual gas sales volume (㎥) 22,678,000,000 761,000,000 3.4
Hospital the number of hospital beds (beds) 1,661,000 236,000 14.2
Type of industries Items
6. When arranging it based on nakamura (2012), fare receipts become
equal to the summary cost including both operating expenses and the
capital charges.
Sales revenues ＝ Full costs
＋ Capital costs
Labor costs Expenses paid
＋ ＋ ＋
Chemical costs Depreciations etc The asset 
＋ ＋ maintenance costs
Power costs Receiving water costs
＋ ＋
Repair costs Others
Operating costs＝ ＝
Chart note 1
Arranged with reference to Nakamura (2012)
7. We also excluded the hospital business sample data after excluding
the water supply business sample data. After doing so, we analyzed
the data once again and the accumulated result was anti-sticky. There
is a possibility that the number of samples can influence the result of
cost behavior of the entire local public enterprises. It can be said that
it is preferable to analyze cost behavior of each business in the future.
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